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Fascism, we are told, is a tool of the capitalist class, a reaction against socialism and 
communism, a Marxist deviation, a psychotic fever that eventually passed after taking a terrible 
toll on European civilization. The debate is lengthy and complicated and despite claims of an 
emerging consensus, the question is still unsettled.
1
 Generally speaking, definitions of fascism 
have left something to be desired, for they are generally too vague, too specific, or too tortured, 
to be of much use. It is no wonder then that some scholars seek to bury the word, and the 
concept, declaring it “precisely dated and meaningless.”2 
 Was fascism really born on March 23, 1919, in Milan, Italy? Did it really die in a bunker 
in Berlin on April 30, 1945? Or was fascism something more, something that might appear 
again? The answer to these questions is more than an idle curiosity.  Establishing a definition 
that allows us to understand Fascism’s nature and what it sought to achieve will allow those of us 
living in the early part of the twenty-first century to know whether fascism is something about 
which we must continue to be concerned or something that is truly dead and buried. 
 This paper will argue that fascism is an ideology in its own right, that it sought to solve 
the problem of modernity, thereby ending man’s alienation from the universe and other men, 
making him whole again and offering an opportunity to transcend his earthly existence. It will 
argue in favour of the following definition: “Fascism is a nationalist, modernizing movement that 
seeks a realignment of society, an alternative modernity, replacing the individual as the central 
figure in history and subjugating him to the nation. In so doing, it offers the individual the 
chance to transcend his earthly existence.” 
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 The advantage of this definition is that it is broadly compatible with Griffin’s definition 
of fascism as “a palingenetic form of populist ultranationalism”3 with one caveat: it addresses the 
question of “Why fascism?” Griffin’s definition, for its succinctness, does not offer an 
explanation of what fascism offers to the individual in order to earn the individual’s support. 
This is critical to any explanation of fascism – indeed to the explanation of any ideology. 
 Another advantage of this definition is that it does not focus on the outward expressions 
of the practice of fascism, thus freeing it from the limitations of early definitions that required of 
fascism various practices such as coloured-shirts, street gangs, charismatic leaders, etc. Such 
definitions tended to be so specific in their requirements of fascism as to run the risk of 
excluding fascist movements that practiced their politics differently and including other political 
movements who merely mimicked the external symbols of fascism.  
 Rather than through these symbols, it is through the idea of “transcendence through 
subjugation” that fascism can be identified as a generic ideology that offers something more than 
“anti-liberalism” or “anti-Marxism” and allows it to be distinguished from those “merely” 
conservative political movements that sought to imitate fascism’s outward manifestations while 
seeking the preservation of the status quo.
4
 
 In order to establish this definition, this paper must accomplish a number of tasks. First, it 
must traverse the minefield that precedes a genuine understanding of fascism. In accepting that 
fascism is a genuine ideology that, however distasteful, contains a certain logic, which seeks to 
solve a problem of humanity, one runs the risk of being accused to sympathizing too much with 
the ideology. Without this understanding, however, one runs another, more dire risk: of 
producing an explanation of the phenomenon that is of little value. This paper takes no position 
“for” or “against” fascism. It seeks only to explain the phenomenon. 
 Second, this paper must identify those generic and ideological aspects that allow for the 
establishment of a definition. In order to do this, it must address those contrary arguments about 
the nature of fascism: that it has no ideological content. There are many scholars who argue that 
fascism is “dead,”5 that the word should be “banned,”6 that it be rejected as “dated or a 
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meaningless term of abuse;”7 it is Gilbert Allardyce who makes the most forceful argument in 
this direction. He declares fascism an “illusion,”8 a word that “means virtually nothing,”9 an idea 
that “exists in faith...pursued by reason.”10 “There is no such thing as fascism,” Allardyce argues. 
“There are only men and movements we call by that name.”11 Though Allardyce’s argument has 
been dismissed as “pointless,”12 “primitive,” “extreme,” and lacking sophistication,13 he raises 
serious enough objections with the method of defining fascism that they should not be dismissed 
out of hand even if his conclusion is erroneous. Once this has been accomplished, the case for 
the above stated definition can be made. Time and space restrictions do not allow for the 
consideration of the Marxist theories of fascism. These will have to be addressed in subsequent 
work. 
THE CHALLENGE OF DEFINING FASCISM  
Defining fascism has proven a difficult task in a way that defining other ideologies has 
not. Liberalism has its founding thinkers and its canon texts. We know that a liberal is someone 
who believes that the individual is the central figure in human history, who believes that the role 
of government should be limited to mediating disputes amongst individuals, and who believes 
that, left to his own devices and hard work, man is well positioned to reach the highest levels of 
his potential. We know this even though in the twenty-first century there are politicians and 
parties who use that label despite advocating a worldview that is quite different, not just from the 
classical definition of liberalism outlined here, but also from other political parties operating in 
the same era. 
 The same is true of Marxism. We know that it is an ideology that warns the tale told by 
liberalism is a fictional one: that liberal freedoms are not true freedoms; that they serve to ensure 
the continued rule of the capitalist class over the workers. True freedom, the Marxist argues, can 
only be attained once human society ceases to be divided by class. We do not doubt the existence 
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of a “Marxist ideology” even though there is disagreement amongst various Marxists about 
priorities and methods for achieving this goal. 
 Both of these ideologies benefit not just from the existence of founding philosophers and 
founding texts. They also benefit from the fact that those who today study the ideologies count 
themselves as liberals and Marxists. This means that disputes about what the ideologies are, what 
they mean, and how they are to adapt to the modern world, are debated from within the 
ideologies themselves. 
 This is not the case for fascism. For even if the ideology did not die with Hitler in that 
bunker in Berlin on April 30, 1945, fascism has been so thoroughly discredited as an ideology 
that it can only be studied from the outside-looking-in. Coupled with the lack of founding 
philosophers and texts, the work of deciphering fascism can only be speculative with very little 
in the way of trustworthy guides. Fragments of thought, cobbled together, coupled with the 
contradictory deeds and words of practicing politicians, and filtered through necessarily 
oppositional political biases is not a recipe for an easily agreed to interpretation of an ideology. 
 As Wolfgang Sauer writes of Nazism: 
 ...the historian faces a phenomenon that leaves him no way but rejection, whatever his 
individual position. There is literally no voice worth considering that disagrees on this 
matter…. Does not such fundamental rejection imply a fundamental lack of understanding? 
And if we do not understand, how can we write history? The term “understanding” has, 
certainly, an ambivalent meaning; we can reject and still “understand.” And yet, our 
intellectual, and psychological capacities reach, in the case of Nazism, a border undreamed 
of by Wilhelm Dilthey. We can work out explanatory theories, but, if we face the facts 
directly, all explanations appear weak. Thus, the attempt to write the history of Nazism 
confronts the historian with an apparently unsolvable dilemma and raises the question of 




 In the face of this challenge it is no wonder that a readily agreed upon definition has 
eluded our grasp. How can one understand a phenomenon that perpetrated such evil? It is far 
easier to dismiss fascism as irrational, a fever, a historical accident, a tool of the capitalists, anti-
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Marxism or anti-liberalism, or even, an illusion. To admit otherwise, that fascism, in its way, had 
a rationality to it, that it had a vision for the future and the organization of humanity, that it 
sought, as do all ideologies, to address the problems of humanity, is simply too difficult. 
 There is a dual sense to this difficulty. In the first sense, fascism is difficult to 
comprehend. It is difficult to imagine, for those born after the war, the sheer scale and horror of 
fascist terror. Further, it is difficult to imagine on what basis an individual might be compelled to 
willingly subjugate himself to the nation and to this ideology. 
 In the second sense, it is difficult to understand fascism because taking fascism seriously, 
engaging it as an ideology in its own right leaves one open to the charge that to seek to 
understand fascism is to attempt to justify it.
15
 Difficult or not, fascism must be understood and 
the only way to understand it is to employ “methodological empathy.”16 This approach, by which 
one attempts to understand fascism as it was seen by its practitioners and followers, which takes 
the phenomenon seriously on its own terms rather than viewing it through one’s own system of 
beliefs, can allow for a more accurate understanding of fascism. 
 The danger of failing to take fascism seriously, to understand it on its own terms is 
demonstrated by Trevor-Roper. He dismisses as “easy” and “fashionable” the discovery of 
currents of thought that led to fascism prior to 1922,
17
 and one wonders what might have been 
different if fascism had been taken seriously from the beginning. It is not possible to undo the 
mistakes of the past but it is certainly possible to avoid their repetition. If the fascist ideas that 
are so easily found today were necessarily unnoticeable prior to March 1919, they must not today 
be dismissed, as Trevor-Roper argues they would have been in 1920, as “separate, parochial 
figures.”18 If fascism is to be truly dead and buried it must be done on the basis of a clear 
understanding. Otherwise, if it cannot be relegated to the past, a clear understanding is still 
required so that it can be recognized when it appears and properly distinguished from historical 
“copycats” and other forms of extremism. 
IDENTIFYING THE GENERIC FEATURES OF FASCISM   
 The failure to understand fascism on its own terms has led a number of weak 
explanations of the phenomenon. Scholars like Trevor-Roper easily exploit these weak 
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explanations, dismissing the idea of generic facism as an “abstraction” “artificially imposed” 
upon the phenomenon, behind which “lie a hundred forms.” 19 Similarly, they make it easy for 
Allardyce to dismiss the notion of generic fascism. Though Allardyce was not the first scholar to 
reject the idea of generic fascism, he presents his argument with a force that demands attention. 
He makes three claims: first, that fascism is not a generic concept; second, that fascism is not an 




 Allardyce’s rejection of the idea of a “generic” fascism is based on the failure of the 
conceptual model approach. This method suggests that there exists an “ideal” type, whether in 
the real world, or as a concept, that can be held up as the example of fascism, the type to which 
all other potential fascist movements are compared. The problem with this approach is that if one 
constructs a faulty ideal-type the entire exercise is rendered pointless. If one points to a modern 
major general and declares him to be the very model of a modern major general, one can find 
one’s self on difficult terrain if one has suggested that a modern major general wears a mustache 
and is then confronted with a clean-shaven example of the same type rather than if one had 
pointed out that all modern major generals, including the model, have been schooled in a 
particular set of strategies and tactics or have all been trained to extract certain behaviour out of 
their subordinates. 
 A definition of fascism that declares fascism to be first and foremost “anti-Marxist,”21 or 
as a tool of big businesses to defend capitalism in times of crisis,
22
 faces difficulties when 
confronted with the Nazi-Soviet Pact. Similarly, a definition of fascism that declares it to be anti-
liberal faces difficulties when confronted by fascist cooperation with liberals on their way into 
power. A definition of fascism that relies on extra-parliamentary street violence and anti-
parliamentarianism cannot account for Colonel de la Rocque and the Croix de Feu who rejected 
the riots of February 6, 1934, and converted itself into the Parti Social Français in 1936. A 
definition of fascism that requires charismatic leadership cannot account for Portugal’s Antonio 
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Salazar or Spain’s Francisco Franco, both of whose most generous descriptions would elide any 
mention of charisma. The result is that Allardyce is able to stand astride attempts at defining a 
generic fascism and declare them failed. The “efforts to develop general theories inevitably 
carries them beyond the limits of specific knowledge” seeing those “formed from the study of 
certain samples...often contradicted by the study of others.”23 
 Matters are only made worse when, like the traveller who insists on using a carry-on bag 
to hold enough clothes for a two month trip, scholars refuse to acknowledge the limits of their 
theories. One example of this is the claim made by Jordi Solé-Tura who argued that “no fascist 
movement recommends the abolition of private ownership of the means of production.” Yet 
when Lloyd Eastman uncovered the blue Shirts of Kuomintang, China, who did indeed argue for 
the abolition of the private ownership of the means of production, scholars dismissed this 
contradiction as “proof of the multifarious forms that fascism assumed in different national 
settings.”24 It is this kind of inconsistency and obstinacy that Allardyce exploits to great effect. 
Despite this, through the examination of Allardyce’s critiques of earlier definitions, various 
generic features of fascism begin to emerge. 
 Nationalism 
 Fascism, Allardyce tells us, is a local phenomenon. At its heart sits is nationalism, which 
prevents its export to other locations and attempts to do so contaminates the other movements it 
confronts.
25
 As Paxton writes, “Each national variant of fascism draws its legitimacy from what 
it considers the most authentic elements of its own community.”26 Thus, one cannot export 
German fascism to Italy, nor Italian to Spain, and so on. If one were to try, one or the other of the 
fascist movements would be corrupted. An example of this is how the Italian Fascists turned 
towards anti-semitism as they fell further under the influence of the Nazis. 
 This is something that fascist leaders themselves seemed to agree upon. Mussolini 
protested that fascism was not for export.
27
 Fascist leaders in France and Spain took umbrage at 
the idea of being lumped together with the likes of Hitler and Mussolini. Jacques Doriot, leader 
of the France’s Parti populaire français had this to say about fascism: “They claim we are 
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fascists, but they know that it is a lie. We do not think that the regime of Hitler or Mussolini can 
be fitted to our country.”28 Primo de Rivera refused to attend the gathering of “international 
fascists” in 1934 because the Falange was not fascist; it was Spanish.29  Little agreement could 
be found amongst those fascists who did attend. Worse still, not even Mussolini and Hitler could 
come to an agreement on what fascism was with Mussolini suggesting that any similarities 
between the Fascists and the Nazis might be superficial at best.
30
 
 It is entirely possible that such early attempts at defining a generic fascism were based on 
superficialities. “Fascism,” Paxton writes, “presents itself to us in vivid primary images: a 
chauvinist demagogue haranguing an ecstatic crowd; disciplined ranks of marching youths; 
colored-shirted militants beating up members of some demonized minority; surprise invasions at 
dawn; and fit soldiers parading through a captured city.”31 It is understandable how various 
national movements employing the same methods can be seen as being part of a larger 
international or generic movement. But such images are the outward manifestations, the signals, 
of fascism. They are not fascism itself. A generic movement based on these superficialities, 
rather than something more substantive, will necessarily break down upon anything more than a 
cursory examination.  
 Such signals pose a double-sided problem for fascism. On the one hand, they provide an 
easy shorthand for observers to lump similar looking movements together regardless of their 
differences. On the other, they are easily mimicked by those who are not, in fact, fascist. As 
Paxton writes, during the interwar period “many regimes that were not functionally fascist 
borrowed elements of fascist decor in order to lend themselves an aura of force, vitality, and 
mass mobilization.”32 It is critical to avoid the trap of mistaking these superficial similarities for 
fascism. But Allardyce goes a step further, dismissing all similarities because they were 
“nationally” different. This is another trap to be avoided. 
 That one fascist organization chose as its symbol the swastika, another a bundle of sticks, 
a third something different; that one fascist looked to the glory of the Roman Empire, another to 
a time of German greatness, or a third to something different; that all advocated for the 
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supremacy of their own nations is proof for Allardyce that “so-called fascist parties are too 
mixed, diverse, and exceptional to be collected into...a general typology.”33 Further, Allardyce 
contends, one does not start to see any kind of generic fascism until the Nazis begin to assert 
their dominance over Europe. Such uniformity is the result only of the Nazis swallowing up the 
“home” movements, either replacing them outright, or forcing them into the Nazis’ own image. 
It is only with the death of fascism as “an independent, spontaneous force” that it begins to look 




 In making this argument, Allardyce ignores the generic feature of fascism that is staring 
him in the face: nationalism. As members of a nationalist movement, fascists in all places argue 
that their nation is supreme. That they disagree with one another about which nation, be it the 
German, Italian, French, or Spanish nation, is the “greatest” does not deny that nationalism is an 
essential, indeed, generic component of fascism. 
 Modernism and Modernization 
 H.A. Turner suggests that fascism might be better understood if it were viewed according 
to the theory of modernization. This theory suggests that the one constant in all recent history is 
the “unprecedentedly thorough and rapid process of change” that saw the replacement of 
traditional societies around the globe as the result of “industrialization, urbanization, 
secularization, and rationalization.”35 Such an approach, Turner argues, might yield the generic 
character of fascism.  
 The modernization theory approach is problematic in Allardyce’s view given that Italian 
Fascism and German Nazism developed under different economic circumstances where the latter 
“arose in the most advanced industrial nation in Western Europe; the other, in a country still 
largely undeveloped.”36 It is not possible, Allardyce suggests, for an ideology to spontaneously 
develop in two different countries at two different stages of development. If the Nazi’s 
subscribed to a “utopian anti-modernism” as Turner suggests,37 how do you account for Italian 
Fascism? Turner’s view makes sense if you consider fascism to be a negative response to 
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modernization in a highly industrialized nation. But this approach cannot account for Italian 
Fascism which appeared in an economically backward nation. If Italy had not modernized, 
against what could the Italian Fascists be reacting? 
 One way of dealing with this problem is to turn it on its head, as A.F.K. Organski does.
38
 
Rather than defining fascism as a reaction against modernity, Organski sees fascism as a way of 
advancing the modernization process. Nazism, in Organski’s view, as characterized by 
Allardyce, was not fascism because fascism was “a developmental stage in the modernization 
process, an elite dictatorship that advanced and industrialized a nation’s economy.”39 Allardyce 
quotes Organski: “Hitler was an authoritarian dictator, a nationalist, an aggressor, a represser, 
and a madman, but he was not a fascist, for Germany was fully industrialized when Hitler came 
to power.”40 
 Together, Turner and Organski have demonstrated Allardyce’s claim that all too often, 
“Interpretations that make sense in the case of one regime often make no sense in the case of the 
other.”41 If these two movements, taken to be the “paradigmatic manifestations”42 of generic 
fascism cannot be united by modernization theory, if they appear in vastly different 
developmental circumstances, how can they be said to be part of the same phenomenon? 
 Alan Cassels attempts to keep the two movements united by providing a dual definition 
of fascism: “modern and anti-modern, rational and irrational, corporative and völkisch.”43 Under 
this theory, fascism can appear in two countries, with different developmental circumstances 
and, depending on those circumstances, advocate for different things. Mussolini and the Fascists 
could push ahead with the modernization of Italy’s economy through a mix of industrialization 
and corporatism. At the same time, the Nazis could rage against the evils of modernization 
seeking to “fly back to a past age where the complexities of modern life had no place.”44 
 Cassels’s dual-definition reunites Nazism and Fascism, even if it does leave unanswered 
the question of how or why a political ideology could spring up under different conditions and 
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advocate for diametrically opposed ends and still be considered part of the same generic 
phenomenon.
45
 The problem with the equation is even worse in Allardyce’s eyes because, he 
argues, that for the supposedly modern Fascists, corporatism was “little more than a “propaganda 
exercise” and the Nazis, supposedly anti-modern “did little to inhibit industry and much to 
promote it.”46 
 Turner supports this claim, writing that the Nazis were “fascinated by technology and, 
despite their hostility to industrial society, stood in awe of German industry.” Indeed, “industry 
grew still bigger in the Third Reich, German cities became still larger, the flight from the land 
persisted, and women continued to be drawn into the labor force.”47 Allardyce draws the 
inference from Cassels that the explanation for this is that the Nazis were “anti-modernist in 
mind but not in practice. Their goal in the future was to ‘demodernize’ Europe; their means in 
the present was to industrialize Germany.”48 For Turner, this is a “simple explanation.”49 In his 
view, “the Nazis...practiced modernization inadvertently in order to pursue their fundamentally 
anti-modern aims.”50 Paxton, too, agrees with this assessment, writing that though Hitler loved 
fast cars and airplanes, “he nursed the archaic dream of installing German peasant colonies in the 
plains of eastern Europe, [and] this dream could be realized only by modern weaponry.”51 
 It is in these definitions of fascism that we see the manifestation of Allardyce’s concerns 
about attempts to define fascism. Having developed theories that do not hold up to their 
confrontation with the facts, Turner and Cassels go to extreme lengths to maintain the legitimacy 
of their theories. Given such explanations it is no wonder why Allardyce believes the search for a 
generic fascism is one faith pursued by reason. One wonders why they simply do not concede the 
point, that the explanation does not work, rather than insisting on that they will shine as brilliant 
as diamonds if only held in the right way under the right light? It is hard to fault Allardyce for 
rubbishing the whole attempt. Yet, simply because the work reviewed to this point has been 
faulty, sometimes seriously so, that does not mean that Allardyce has drawn the correct 
conclusion. 
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 Several questions arise out of Allardyce’s critique. Was Italy really as backwards as 
Allardyce claims? Was modernization little more than propaganda for Mussolini and the 
Fascists? Did the Nazis really harbour regressive ambitions, seeking to turn back the clock on 
modernity and return to some idyllic point in the past? 
 While admittedly not as industrialized as Germany, Italy was not the pre-modern state 
that Allardyce suggests. Between 1879 and 1887, Italy experienced an industrial growth 
“spurt”52 followed by an industrial revolution between 1896 and 1914, which doubled industrial 
production in the country and increased the national income by nearly 50%.
53
 Granted, the 
number of those employed by agriculture was twice that employed by industry but the majority 
of those appear to be in the south rather than in the north where fascism was most active. If this 
is true, what happens to the modernization theories of fascism? 
 In the first place, it raises doubts about the accuracy of Allardyce’s claim about the pre-
modernity of Italy. While granting that Italy and Germany had experienced different degrees of 
industrialization, if both were, broadly speaking, industrialized, then Allardyce’s negation of the 
modernization theory on the grounds that Italy and Germany were at two completely different 
stages of development is invalidated. 
 But what accounts for the modernizing language of the Fascists? If Italy were 
modernized would one not expect to encounter rhetoric in Italy, as found in Germany, which 
sought a return to an idyllic period? The Fascists might have been expected to extol the virtues of 
the undeveloped south of Italy but they do not. Instead, they reach to the past for symbols and 
images for the purpose of inspiring Italians to move forward into the future, to inspire them to 
achieve new glories rather than recapturing old ones. 
 So appears a twist on Cassel’s Janus-faced fascism. Rather than the production of modern 
and anti-modern fascisms appearing in pre-modern and modern societies respectively, modern 
Italy produced modernizing fascists while modern Germany produced anti-modern ones. What 
accounts for this? Perhaps this seeming paradox is the result of a misunderstanding of the 
attitudes towards modernization displayed by the fascists. 
 If the Fascists’ failure to implement corporatism was the result, not of such rhetoric being 
propaganda, but rather of an inability or ineptitude to implement the plan, then one can cover 
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much of the distance needed to explain this part of the paradox. Cassels is supportive of this 
point, suggesting that corporatism was an “innate impulse” of Italian fascism and that the failure 
to implement it was the result of Mussolini’s “incompetence and the intractability of Italian 
society.”54 When one considers the number of compromises that Mussolini had to make to get 
into and maintain power along with the fact that throughout his time in office he remained 
beholden to the king, this argument makes sense.
55
 
 As for the Nazis, whether or not they were truly as backward-looking as suggested by 
Turner, Paxton, and Cassels is open to debate. Turner believed that Hitler and Himmler, among 
others, “looked to the early middle ages [and] to pre-Christian, even pre-civilized, times” 
prescribing “a revival of the cults of soil and sword” striving to “free the bulk of the German 
people from the grip of industrial society and return them to the simple agrarian life.”56 
According to Paxton, Hitler “nursed an archaic dream of installing German peasant colonies on 
the plains of eastern Europe.”57 Cassels suggests that Hitler’s ideal society may have been the 
feudal age “[b]ut more likely, this ideal past society was something more primitive, compounded 
of the Wagnerian operas and ancient Germanic sagas that the Führer admired so much.”58 
 All of this is thrown into doubt by Allardyce when he points out that the Nazis, despite 
their rhetoric, did very little to return to a pre-modern period, and much to continue Germany 
down the path of modernization.
59
 Eric Dorn Brose supports this, citing a number of instances in 
which Hitler spoke strongly in favour of modern industry.
60
 Eugen Weber, for his part, casts 
doubt on just how backward looking the Nazis were when he describes Hitler’s “ideal world [as] 
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that of the turn-of-the-century Viena and Wilhelminian Germany he had known, his ‘new 
German man’ was the ideal bourgeois of those days.”61 
 What if the pre-modernist streak in Nazism was the “propaganda exercise” and they, in 
fact, had no intention of halting the industrialization of Germany? What if continued 
modernization and industrialization was the “truth” for fascists. If this is the case, then one can 
resolve the modernization paradox: any failure on the part of the Nazis to turn back the clock 
was because they had no intention of doing so. Additionally, any failure on the part of the Italian 
Fascists to modernize Italy was the result of an inability to do so, rather than a lack of desire. 
 While this makes sense, Dorn Brose points out that it is incorrect, and even “pointless” to 
argue “whether Nazism and Fascism were modern or anti-modern. Viewed solely from the 
standpoint of the machine, they were obviously both.” He argues that both Nazism and Fascism 
contained three strains of thought towards technology within their parties. There were those who 
were “reactionary modernists and technocrats,” those who were “technophobes and return-to-
the-soil fanatics,” and “charismatic leaders who reserved [sic] a place for the machine in a 
‘reformed’ postindustrial world.”62 
 These competing strains of thought within the fascist movements, coupled with the very 
short period of time that they were in power, make it very difficult to draw conclusions about 
what it was that the fascists actually intended. As Ian Kershaw points out, six of the twelve years 
the Nazis were in power were spent fighting a war and “war, especially on the scale of the 
Second World War, contains its own momentum for rapid social change.”63 If intentions are 
difficult to discern, what then were the effects of fascist rule? 
 Kershaw highlights the work of Ralf Dahrendorf, who put forth the thesis that regardless 
of what the Nazis intended “their Gleichschaltung (‘co-ordination’) of German society, they had 
destroyed German ‘tribal loyalties,’ breaking traditional anti-liberal religious, regional, family, 
and corporative bonds, reduced élites to a ‘monopolistic clique,’ and had levelled down social 
strata to the equalizing status of the Volksgenosse, the ‘people’s comrade.’”64 This “destruction 
of traditional loyalties, norms, and values” meant that all traces of the past to which the Nazis 
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might have wanted to return had been destroyed.
65
 This left but one path for the fascists to 
follow: the path of modernization. 
 Based on this, the conclusion to draw is that fascism whether by grudge or by design, was 
a modernizing ideology. Whatever the rhetoric of wanting to return to some kind of earlier time, 
such a return was not possible. But nor was it desirable to follow the path of modernity that the 
liberals and Marxists were following. Therefore, if the fascists were going to have to accept that 
the “damage was done,” their task was to construct an alternative modernity that could solve the 
problems of humanity, the most notable of which was its alienation. 
 THE IDEOLOGY OF FASCISM 
 To this point, the generic features of fascism – nationalism and the seeking of an 
alternative modernity – have been identified. These features are consistent with Griffin’s 
definition of fascism. To complete the exercise, attention must now be turned to identifying the 
ideological content of fascism; to figuring out why fascism existed and what it hoped to 
accomplish and, just as importantly, what did fascism offer to its adherents in return for their 
support? 
 Answering this question is no less difficult than identifying the generic components of 
fascism. Indeed, it may be even tougher. This is for three reasons, two of which were discussed 
earlier in this paper: one the lack of a common founder, and two the fact that fascism is 
necessarily studied “from without” meaning that there can be no objective declaration of what 
fascism stood for. Its ultimate meaning, then, is imposed from the outside, and is necessarily 
easily criticized. The third problem is that the fascists were, in practice, notoriously 
opportunistic, the first politicians to make a virtue of lying. It is therefore impossible to believe 
anything they said about their aims and intentions.
66
 
 The results are approximations of fascist ideology that are heavily coloured by the biases 
of the observer. If one places great weight on the opportunism of fascism in practice and believes 
that fascism is an illusion, as Allardyce does, then one would be inclined against an ideological 
component as well, arguing that fascism offered nothing: no hope for salvation, “no view of 
history, no ideal for the future” and represented no social class, no economic interest, and no 
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 On the other hand, if one is of the view that all ideas are the product of 
social relations, one might be inclined to understand fascism as a tool of the capitalist class 
seeking a way to hold onto its position of dominance during the final stage of capitalism. 
 To those who subscribe to such positions, the posing of the question about what it was 
fascism offered to its adherents in return for their support is pointless. To answer it is 
methodologically questionable.
68
 But the question must be asked and answered. For fascism did 
not seek to come to power solely through the exercise of will and violence. Instead, fascists 
sought the support of the masses and, indeed, understood that the legitimacy of their movement 
derived from that support.
69
 In order to obtain and maintain that support, the fascists needed to 
offer something to the public in return. The return the fascists offered went beyond mere material 
gains (although material gains certainly did play a role) and offered individuals the chance to end 
their alienation from the rest of humanity. 
 By what method shall the answer to this question be determined? Allardyce warns of the 
dangers of trusting the words of fascists and also objects to the cherry-picking of evidence and 
attempting to trace the development of the ideology by fixing on an idea and then finding “an 
earlier thinker who appears to have originated, possessed, or transmitted the idea” and assigning 
“to the original thinker a place into the philosophical tradition leading to fascism” declaring them 
“pre-fascist” or “proto-fascist.”70 Allardyce is right to be concerned about any approach that 
appears to draw straight lines from thinkers in one era to the next and declaring them to be 
directly related. However, to ignore the importance of thinkers who in one era identify a set of 
problems that remain unsolved in the next or subsequent eras is to make a mistake of a different 
kind. 
 Consider the criticisms unleashed on liberal democracy by Ernest Renan in France. 
Renan “condemned ‘the idea of equal rights of all men, the way of conceiving government as a 
mere public service which one pays for, and to which one owes neither respect nor gratitude, a 
kind of American impertinence,’ the claim ‘that politics can be reduced to a mere consultation of 
the will of the majority.’”71 Such an attitude, Rehan argued, “could only give rise to ‘a sort of 
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universal mediocrity.’”72 What is significant is that Rehan was writing in the 1870s and, as 
Sternhell points out, the criticisms of liberal democracy he laid out had little changed some 
twenty years later during the fin-de-siècle, nor even later in the 1930s.
73
 
 Mussolini may have highlighted Renan’s “pre-fascist illuminations”74 but Sternhell is 
careful not to draw a direct link. After all, Renan was not a fascist, he was a conservative.
75
 
Instead, what matters is that the attacks on capitalism and liberal democracy came from both the 
Right and the Left and, in so doing, created the opportunity for the emergence of fascist ideas. 
 The problem of the trustworthiness of fascists is a critical one. For Allardyce, if nothing 
else has succeeded in killing the idea of a fascist ideology, then it is on this hill that the concept 
shall meet its final end. While all politicians throughout history have readily changed their minds 
when circumstances warranted, discarding seemingly strongly held beliefs in the pursuit of 
power, they generally always attempted to justify them in some way. For Mussolini and Hitler, it 
was different. They “were the first [politicians] to make a public creed of lying.”76 Of Mussolini, 
Allardyce writes that the Italian leader “described his own method as the technique of the 
‘Scotch douche,’ gushing alternately hot and cold, radical and conservative, sounding reasonable 
at one moment and intransigent at the next, whatever the occasion demanded.”77 Fascism was a 
“‘super-relativist’ movement with no fixed principles, ready for almost any alliance.”78 It was, 
above all, “a path to political power.”79 
 According to Allardyce, “such men simply cannot be taken at their word, yet the quoted 
word is the mode of intellectual history. Confronting confessed liars compromises the traditional 
method of using quotations from speeches and writings to document arguments on the belief or 
motives of historical personalities.”80 In the face of this, the only way to resolve any 
contradictions between word and deed is, in the view of Paxton, to pay attention to the deeds, for 
the deeds are real.
81
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 This approach is unsatisfactory, however, because it leads one necessarily to the 
conclusion that fascism is irrational, purely opportunistic, and devoid of any true meaning, which 
is certainly not how the fascists saw themselves. Nor can it explain the levels of popular support 
the fascists enjoyed at various times. There must be something more to this phenomenon. 
 Ever since the beginning of the modern age, humanity has struggled with the problem of 
alienation. From the time the first fence was erected, enclosing a plot of land for one’s personal 
use, humanity has experienced an ever increasing isolation from nature and, indeed, from other 
humans, withdrawing further and further into himself until he stands alone facing the world, 
disconnected from all and sundry. 
 Throughout the course of the industrial revolution, through the nineteenth and into the 
twentieth centuries, this alienation intensified, swallowing up greater and greater numbers, 
wreaking havoc on society, destroying the familiar patterns of people’s lives. Where once they 
had been governed by the rhythms of the universe – waking as the sun rose, sleeping as it set; 
hunting, gathering, and farming according to the changing of the seasons – humanity was 
beginning to march to the beat of a new drummer. Inserting itself between the mass of man and 
the universe was an artificial timekeeper, the mechanized metronome known as the machine. 
 As the machine spread, the rhythms of life had less and less connection to anything real. 
The 12-hour shift or the 8-hour shift was dictated not by the available daylight, nor by the needs 
of the worker to ensure enough food for him and his family. Instead, it was dictated by the 
machine’s owner and his profit needs. 
 Industrialization was coupled with the breakdown of traditional societies. More and more 
people left the country-side in search of work in the factories of growing cities disrupting family 
life. Disconnected now from the land, from family, and indeed, from the fruits of his own labour, 
man had become like a cog in a machine that directed itself to a purpose no grander than the 
production of profit for some other person or conglomerate. 
 “Industrialization, urbanization, secularization, and rationalization,” to recall Turner’s 
phrase, were destroying everything that humanity had known. Industrialization was destroying 
the rhythms of life. Urbanization was destroying the family and traditional morality. 
Secularization was destroying the church and taking with it the possibility that humanity might 
have a chance at transcending his earthly existence, achieving eternal life. Rationalization was 
19 
 
destroying the personal relationships and the hope of building anything great on earth, sacrificing 
them to the importance of turning a profit. 
 Life had lost any sense of purpose. “Progress,” Weber writes, “was an illusion.”82 
Without a sense of purpose, without a “grand project,” and left to its own devices, history would 
lead inevitably to decadence and decline, as Renan warned. It was this problem that all great 
ideologies attempt to address. 
 The liberals, for their part, preached that hard work was its own success. They placed the 
individual at the centre of history and argued that by giving each person basic freedoms and, 
provided he worked hard, he could attain his fullest existence. The problem was that it was 
liberalism that had led to the intensification of the problems of modernity and thus came under 
attack from both the Right and the Left. The attack from the Right has been partially 
demonstrated through the words of Renan quoted above and is not that dissimilar from the attack 
of the Left. Liberal-democratic rule, both sides agreed, was seen as a way of hiding the “self-
serving rule of a self-serving elite.”83 According to the Left, liberal freedoms were not freedoms 
at all. 
 The answer for the Left was the overthrow of class rule. The individual could only be 
free once the bourgeoisie had been overthrown and all classes abolished. The problem with this, 
however, was that for the socialists, as well as the liberals, the individual was still the basic unit. 
For all of their talk of collective action, the goal of the socialist is the same as the liberal’s: to 
free the individual. “Socialism is at odds with Liberalism only on the question of the 
organization of production and the division of wealth,” wrote Alfredo Rocco.84 It does nothing to 
address the atomization of man. 
 Into this breach stepped the fascists. The fascists rejected “the old atomistic and 
mechanical state theory which was the basis of the liberal and democratic doctrines with an 
organic and historic concept.”85 They rejected the materialism embodied by liberalism, Marxism, 
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and democracy and sought an alternative: a way of transcending them, offering a greater reward 
than mere riches.
86
 The way to achieve this was the creation of a new society.  
 Under liberalism the state belongs to the bourgeoisie. Under socialism it belongs to the 
proletariat. It is only under national socialism, or fascism, that such divisions can be brought to 
an end, that the state becomes the property of everyone (and everyone property of it). The state 
represents the interests of everyone because their interests are the state’s interests.87 Rather than 
“‘society for the individual,’ we have ‘individuals for society.’”88 This means that all members 
of the community are working towards the betterment of the nation rather than looking out for 
their own individual interests. In so doing, the rootlessness of man can be brought to an end. 
 But this was no Utopian model. It was based on the realities of existence on earth.
89
 Thus 
life for the individual under fascism would remain difficult. Fascism offered no solution to the 
problem of an existence that was “nasty, brutish, and short.” Man would remain a cog, an 
individual on an assembly line, anonymous and small, “transient and insignificant,”90 with one 
significant difference from the liberal system: his actions would be unified with that of the rest of 
the members of his community, he would be made whole again by the fact that all would be 
working towards the greatness of the nation. Fascism “appeared to be a movement capable of 
transcending the banality of everyday life and integrating the individual into a new ‘moral 
community.’”91 Though the individual may not experience wealth or fame, by directing his 
efforts towards this grand project he is reunited with his fellow man, with all who preceded him 
and all who will follow him. He can stretch out his arms, grasping the alpha and omega of 
history, bringing an end to his alienation. 
 Fascism, thus, cannot be discerned from the daily actions of its practicing politicians, as 
Paxton suggests. To do so, as mentioned, leads one to the conclusion that fascism is entirely 
irrational because it fails to grasp the larger picture. Fascism must be considered from the point 
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of view of its ideology. As Sternhell contends, “The nature of a political ideology always 
emerges more clearly in its aspirations than it is application.”92 
 It is only by looking at the ultimate aim of fascism – bringing an end to the atomization 
of man – that one can hope to understand the actions of its politicians. Trying to understand the 
fascist as one understands a liberal or socialist politician is to miss the point entirely. As Rocco 
argued, the liberal and socialist were united in their ultimate aim. Their goals, similar to those 
who argued for Italy to remain neutral in the First World War, were “material advantages, 
advantages tangible, ponderable, palatable.” The fascists, on the other hand, like the 
Interventionists, “stood for moral advantages, intangible, impalpable, imponderable -- 
imponderable at least on the scales used by their antagonists.”93 
     There is an element of the religious to this. As Emilio Gentile writes, it was not 
political doctrine that united fascists, but rather, faith. Faith in the nation and faith in the ability 
of the leaders to organize society in such a way to bring about the nation’s greatness, and faith 
that the greatness of the nation would allow the individual to transcend his meagre, earthly 
existence. By involving the masses in this exercise, by converting them to this new “fascist 




 The offer fascism made to its prospective followers was bringing about the end to their 
collective alienation, unifying them under the banner of the nation, directing their activities 
towards the greatness of that nation, and, in so doing, constructing an alternative modernity. This 
is the answer to the question, “Why fascism?” 
 There are certainly significant doubts as to the effectiveness of the fascist argument. 
Mack Smith, for instance, suggests that support for fascism was contingent on “outward 
successes” – material gains – and Italians supported the Fascists only so long as no other 
alternative was visible. When such alternatives did appear, rare though it may have been, “the 
whole machinery of totalitarian consent disintegrated in a moment. This suggests that the 
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consensus behind fascism must have been largely cynical….”95 Though this may be true, it 
serves only to cast doubt on the attractiveness of the fascist ideology, not its content. 
CONCLUSION 
 Thus, fascism can be defined as a nationalist, modernizing movement that seeks a 
realignment of society, an alternative modernity, replacing the individual as the central figure in 
history and subjugating him to the nation, offering the individual the chance to transcend his 
earthly existence. This definition, while broadly consistent with Griffin’s definition of fascism as 
“a palingenetic form of populist ultranationalism,” goes a step further by explaining what it is the 
fascists offered to individuals in return for their support. 
 This definition could only be arrived at by examining Gilbert Allardyce’s criticisms of 
earlier analyses of fascism. While Allardyce correctly identifies many flaws in the work of 
earlier scholars he draws the wrong conclusions. The failure of earlier definitions rested not on 
the non-existence of fascism but rather on a faulty understanding of fascism. Fascism can only be 
understood if one employs “methodological empathy” – attempting to understand a phenomenon 
in its own terms – without appearing to argue for its revival. This paper has done that. 
 The definition of fascism argued in this paper suggests that fascism is not a “dead” 
ideology. Instead, since fascism seeks to address the problem of the alienation of man, it is an 
ideology that is liable to appear so long as this problem remains unsolved. It will not necessarily 
do so in the same guise as it did during the interwar period, but could instead appear in a form 
characteristic of whatever era in which it re-emerges. 
 This paper is not the final word on this topic. It raises as many questions as it answers. It 
has not dealt with the Marxist analysis of fascism. It has not addressed questions of racism and 
war and the role that they play in fascist ideology and practice. Nor has it addressed the centrality 
of “palingenesis” to Griffin’s definition, an idea that was certainly critical to the fascism of the 
interwar period, but is not necessarily central to a re-emergent fascism which could conceivably 
arise in nations that have not yet experienced greatness. As such, this paper should be considered 
part of an ongoing body of research and these questions will be addressed in future work.  
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